Portland State University

PDXScholar
University Honors Theses

University Honors College

8-6-2020

The Performativity and Dynamics of H.P. Grice's
"Logic and Conversation": an Interdisciplinary Reconceptualization
Linnea Alexander
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/honorstheses
Part of the Philosophy of Language Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Alexander, Linnea, "The Performativity and Dynamics of H.P. Grice's "Logic and Conversation": an
Interdisciplinary Re-conceptualization" (2020). University Honors Theses. Paper 931.
https://doi.org/10.15760/honors.954

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

The Performativity and Dynamics of H.P. Grice’s “Logic and Conversation”: An
Interdisciplinary Re-conceptualization

by
Linnea Alexander

An undergraduate honors thesis submitted in partial fulﬁllment of the
requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Arts
in
University Honors
and
Liberal Studies

Thesis Adviser
Dr. Brenda Glascott

Portland State University
2020

1

Abstract
The following paper covers an interdisciplinary examination and re-conceptualization of
philosopher H.P. Grice’s “Logic and Conversation.” By way of interdisciplinary analysis and
theory building, this paper breaks down Grice’s philosophical understandings of conversational
pragmatics as well as significant components of speech act theory, as put forth by philosopher J.
L. Austin and revisited by J. R. Searle, and interactive frame theory as understood in
sociocultural linguistic anthropology by Deborah Tannen and Cynthia Wallat. It interrogates
shortcomings of Grice’s understanding of conversation and draws from speech act and frame
theory to fill these shortcomings and expand on Grice’s original work. The result is a new,
interdisciplinary method of conversational analysis which accounts for the performativity of
conversational contributions and the dynamics of the contextual knowledge which shapes the
dexterity of participants in an interaction. This new method of understanding may be applied to
discourse analysis settings in a variety of areas of study. Additionally, it may be used to examine
how specific facets of language function in conversational context (i.e. gender or race) and may
be applied to arenas of interaction outside of verbal conversation.

Introduction
Theories of language and discourse have long been explored within various fields of
study, including philosophy, sociology, anthropology, English studies and linguistics. As social
beings, conversation and interpersonal interaction lie at the heart of the human experience.
Understanding the nature of human interaction through structures of language and other forms of
non-verbal communication is essential to understanding successful (and failed) collaboration and
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to creating newer and more effective conversational strategies. Indeed, understanding interaction
plays a central role in the pursuit to better understand the relationship between the external,
social world and the human mind.
As such, philosophers have interrogated the functions, values, and processes through
which the wheels of language and conversation turn. Central to the field of philosophy, H.P.
Grice’s extremely influential “Logic and Conversation” proposes a system for analyzing the
implicature (definitive qualities) and “success” values of conversations through adherence to a
number of conversational maxims which, together, form a theoretical ideal of conversational
cooperation between participants as they work in tandem toward an agreed-upon trajectory.1
Grice further creates a groundwork method for understanding conversational contributions
through the meanings produced and derived from the contents of what is said, as well as the
surrounding context. This paper centers Grice’s work as a foundation from which to build upon.
Using Grice’s understanding of pragmatics and conversation, I expand on his work by
incorporating components of two other theoretical frameworks--namely speech act and
interactive frame theories.
In order to rethink Gricean thought I draw upon an understanding of language and
conversation that predates Grice’s work. Also rooted within the field of philosophy of language,
speech act theory, conceptualized originally by J. L. Austin and developed further by John R.
Searle promotes an understanding of language in action by analyzing the performative values
invoked through the production and reception of utterances. Critics have argued that placing
complete emphasis on communicative performativity disregards the meaning derived from
language as a formal system of information. While Grice’s work accounts for this oversight, its
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concept of implicature verges on disregard for performativity altogether, revolving around the
concept that the content of a conversational contribution contains its meaning rather than the
action of producing the contribution itself. To compensate for this oversight I expand on Grice’s
original work to incorporate the performative properties of language and conversation which are
central to speech act theory.
In addition to expanding on Grice’s work from within field of philosophy, this thesis
extends across disciplines in an effort to deepen understandings of language and conversation
from a variety of angles. Within the fields of linguistic sociology and anthropology, there also
exist a number of theories pertaining to discourse and interpersonal interaction which I draw
upon to add one more layer of understanding this Gricean reconceptualization. While these
theories have emerged independently of and stand separate from those put forth in philosophy,
they are complimentary. Although the work of Deborah Tannen and Cynthia Wallat--hailing
from backgrounds in linguistics and sociology--does not directly address philosophy as a school
of thought, their work in discourse analysis sports a theory of frames and schemas that very
easily fits into the realm of philosophy of language. These terms are not new to the fields of
linguistics, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence, though they were initially
conceptualized as structures of expectation that humans process as they internalize their external
world.2 However, as use of these concepts has expanded into the worlds of anthropology,
sociology, and linguistic anthropology (circa the late 20th century) they have been adopted as
tools for understanding the interactive components to discourse and interpersonal navigations-effectively the “footing” which accounts for human dexterity to adapt, interpret, and move within
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Deborah Tannen and Cynthia Wallat, "Interactive Frames and Knowledge Schemas in Interaction: Examples from
a Medical Examination/Interview," Social Psychology Quarterly 50, no. 2 (1987): 206-207.
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a conversational experience moment to moment.3, 4 Tannen and Wallat have broadened the use
and understanding of frames to take on a linguistic, sociological, and anthropological
component. I draw from interactive frame theory to incorporate aspects of conversational
dynamics and dexterity into my expansion of Grice’s foundational thought.
Recognizing the great value in interdisciplinary engagement of theories of language, the
following work aims to analyze, expand, and interweave the central work of H.P. Grice’s “Logic
and Conversation” with concepts borrowed from both speech act and interactive frame theories
and construct a hybridized method of conversational analysis by means of interdisciplinary
analysis and the development of new analytic and theoretical epistemologies. After examining
Grice’s work as a foundation, I analyze components of speech act theory, which I then use to
rethink aspects of Grice’s understandings and build a new framework of Gricean thought that
incorporates performativity. I then repeat this process of analysis and incorporation, turning my
attention to interactive frame theory, from which I borrow concepts of dynamics and
conversational dexterity to revise and build upon Gricean thought. The end result aims to expand
Gricean concepts of language and conversation to incorporate the performative value of language
as introduced in speech act theory and the dynamics of human interaction as conceptualized
within interactive frame theory. This reconceptualized theoretical framework may be used in the
future as a tool of conversational analysis and metathought across multiple fields of study.

A Critical Review of H.P. Grice’s “Logic and Conversation”

3
4

Erving Goffman, Forms of Talk, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981).
John Gumperz, Discourse Strategies, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

5

Grice lays out a formula of a logically utopian conversation which he categorizes under a
single dominant feature of cooperation.5 His correspondingly coined Cooperative Principle (CP)
advises participants in a conversation to keep their contributions appropriate to the mutually
agreed upon trajectory and goals which the conversation aims to fulfill at the moment in which
the contribution is made.6 Under the umbrella of the CP, Grice explicates four maxims and a
number of sub-maxims, which generally contribute to the participants’ accordance to the CP.7
The first of these maxims, Quantity, regards the amount of information provided by the
conversant as evaluated through two submaxims--that one should make their contribution as
informative and no more informative than is necessitated by the trajectory of the conversation.8
The second, Quality, necessitates that one’s contribution should be “true,” in that one mustn’t
contribute information they know to be false or lack sufficient evidence grounded in truth.9 The
following maxim, Relation, contains only the directive to make one’s contribution relevant to the
conversation.10 The final maxim, Manner, constitutes an awareness not to the content of the
contribution itself but rather how the contribution is presented.11 To “be perspicuous” is Grice’s
advice, which he breaks down into four submaxims: to avoid obscurity and ambiguity, and to be
concise and orderly.12
There are instances in which these four maxims may also exist outside of the verbalized
component of a conversation, in the sphere of unspoken communication.13 For instance, if one
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were to assist another individual in fixing their car, it would be expected that one would assist no
less or more than necessary, assist only in areas in which they are well-versed, and attend to only
parts that are relevant to the particular state of the vehicle while verbally clarifying what one is
doing to the individual’s property.14 The application of these maxims is, as such, versatile,
examining conversation as contextual and behavioral rather than simply through script.
In defining these maxims that together compose the CP, Grice asks what basis might
account for the maxims and the CP we all tend to follow.15 While the most simple answer is that
we follow these maxims out of habit derived from social conditioning imposed upon us as early
as in infancy, Grice seeks an answer that accounts not only for the natural, but for the reasonable
drive behind our actions.16 Perhaps, he speculates, our usage of conversational conventions may
be attributed to the rationale that these practices are logically reasonable and therefore should be
followed.17 This rationale constitutes what Grice views as a universally accepted quasicontractual agreement, so that in every--or at least most conversations--the conversant operates
under the presumption that all conversants share this rationale and will therefore work
cooperatively.18 This idea, however, Grice deems too selective to account for all variety of
interaction, so he broadens the scope of his work to show that observance of the CP and
associated maxims is deemed rational on the basis that anyone who cares about the goals of a
conversation will have an interest in conversational profitability as fulfilled in accordance with
the maxims and the CP.19
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Indeed, failing to abide to a maxim(s) threatens to jeopardize the profitability of a
conversation. Grice outlines four actions that may result in the failure of a maxim, and in most
cases, the corresponding failure to abide by the CP: 1) the inconspicuous violation of a maxim,
2) the explicitly indicated opting out, 3) the clash resulting from an inability to fulfill one maxim
without violating another, and 4) the flouting of a maxim, or the blatant act of failure to fulfill
it.20 In certain instances, flouting a maxim may not diminish the cooperative value of the
conversation, but may serve to exploit the maxim and shift what is conversationally implied.21
This phenomenon may be clarified by the following example of a verbal distraction as a means
of changing the subject:
Two individuals are having a conversation about politics which becomes uncomfortable
to one of the people involved. The uncomfortable individual asks, “How has the weather been in
your neck of the woods lately?” This question flouts the maxim of relation as it has absolutely no
relevance to the subject which they have been talking about. By blatantly flouting the maxim,
however, the individual exploits an awareness of irrelevance of their contribution to indicate
their discomfort to the other conversant and steer the conversation in a new and mutually
enjoyable direction. While in isolation this question may have a straightforward meaning, when
used in the act of flouting a maxim it gains a more situationally specific conversational
implication. The utterance no longer retains its verbatim meaning. Rather there is a shift in the
meaning of the question, implying that the individual is uncomfortable and intends to push the
conversation onto a different topic.
Grice distinguishes conversational implicature from conventional implicature by virtue of
constructed versus natural presumption. While the word “implicature” indicates the presence of

20
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intuition and a sort of “gut response” so to speak, conventional implicature encompasses literal
meaning and that which we may intuitively grasp. Conversational implicature must be traceable,
able to be deconstructed in its derived meaning.22 Conversational implicature may be
particularized to a specific conversational context, or it may be generalized, at which point it
may exist under the disguise of conventional implicature, yet under examination proves to be
explainable even in common or normalized thought processes.23 This generalized conversational
implicature is exemplified in the conversational and contextual social norms under which
individuals operate. While normalized meanings appear natural to the naked eye, they are in fact
derived through construction that has become unanimous through its consistency overtime.
Grice further distinguishes conversational and conventional implicature in his conclusion
that only conversational implicature is “cancellable” under the presumption that conversational
implicature stems from abiding with the CP, as well as accepting an ability to opt out of the CP
by failing to fulfill a maxim.24
Grice posits that conversational implicature is an essential component to deriving the
meaning of a contribution, for changing or excluding a conversational implicature shifts the
contribution in meaning as well, unless a satisfactory substitution is implicated.25 Furthermore, in
order to speak approximately and still abide with the CP, there must be a conversational
implicatum (definition, so to speak) that is excluded in the expression’s conventional meaning. 26
An implicatum’s truth value is not dependent on the literal truth value of an utterance, but rather
by how it is conveyed, and since it is necessary to account for what is expected to be
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presupposed in a conversation in order isolate and focus in on the exact meaning of a
contribution, conversational implicature is an essential component to successfully cooperative
conversation.27

Gricean Thought and Speech Act Theory
Grice’s notion of successful conversation as measurable by the participants’ collective
ability to cooperate and achieve a conversational “goal” maps neatly onto theories of speech acts
proposed originally by philosopher J. P. Austin and revisited by John R. Searle. Speech act
theory defines language and speech as more than just a mechanism for information and
conventional meaning. A speech act, much like a conversation, involves both the speaker and the
receiver(s) of a language contribution. Austin’s concept of speech as performative--meaning that
it carries out a specific intended action through the utterance based on the goal of the utterer-supports the notion that conversational contributions are performative towards accomplishing a
shared conversational goal.28 Furthermore, Austin speculates that the success of a speech act
depends on the consumer of that act perceiving the same goal intended by the producer of the
utterance. This is consistent with Grice’s notion that there must be a communally agreed upon
goal of conversation, and failure to cooperate to achieve that goal may ensue failure in the
conversation.29
Austin specifies three types of speech acts that may add further understanding to Grice’s
categorizations of conventional and conversational implicature. While the conventional
definition of a speech act has come to encompass only the last of these three components, all
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three may be applied in understanding Gricean implicatures.30 The locutionary act, the physical
act of producing the phonetic components comprising an utterance, may be equated simply to the
act of engaging in a conversation.31 Perlocutionary acts, defined as the acts carried out through
saying something--the consequences intended or otherwise--Austin notes as specifically not
intuitively part of the literal meaning of the words uttered--a definition that mirrors Grice’s
definition of conversational implicature.32, 33 Illocutionary acts denote the conventionally
recognized use of certain types of utterances.34 While the nature of the illocutionary act is to
derive conventional understandings, much as Grice defines conventional implicature, there is a
distinction in the nuance of operational application of these two analytic terms. While Grice
identifies conventional implicature as having to do with the literal and natural meanings
associated with one’s words, the illocutionary act plays into yet another facet of speech that may
be further applicable to Grice’s analysis of conversation--the conventional presuppositions we
hold around not simply the words themselves, but rather particular types of utterances and their
natural functions.35
For example, if two individuals were engaged in conversation, and one asked: “do you
like my new shirt?” Gricean logic would understand the conventional meaning of the utterance to
be about the article of clothing the utterer was wearing at the specific time of the utterance, and
the conversational implicature might be the expectation of a compliment, or a sentiment of value
for the other’s opinion. Austin’s operational illocutionary act analysis would focus on the
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performativity of the type of utterance, in this case an inquisition. He would posit, then, that the
conventional understanding of an inquisition is a merit for a direct reply which gives an opinion
or otherwise responds to the sentiments put forth by the utterer of the inquisition.36 This
distinction is perhaps more effective in analyzing a conversation, as it directly invests not only in
the meanings a consumer of the utterance may derive from the speech act (as is the focal point of
Grice’s implicatures), but the implicit, yet universal understanding of how different types of
utterances are put forth and responded to, and how intent informs and drives conversation both
on the end of the producer and receiver.
The flaw in Grice’s work is limiting his notion of conventional meaning to the content of
the sentence and the meaning derived from the words which comprise it. Speech act theory offers
greater effectiveness in analyzing the cooperation and interaction between conversants as it
examines conventionalities in universally applicable presumptions surrounding types of
utterances, rather than the contents of an utterance in contextual isolation. As such, this theory is
more applicable to understanding both the intent of the speaker beyond the specific verbatim
context of the conversation. On the other hand, to only focus on the type of utterance and the
universally-agreed-upon intent which arises from that type of utterance fails to recognize the
intricacies and meanings of utterances derived through the implicature of the particular
utterance’s word content. As every conversation is unique (it is unheard of to organically
recreate a conversation verbatim, not to mention with the same unspoken components), this
failure to grasp at particularity and situational specificity risks a major faux pas in scholarly
conversation around conversation. It is necessary, then, to consider both the implicature of a
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conversational contribution and the more generalized implications of the type of utterance being
performed.
If we then identify the illocutionary act of an utterance to be the “macro” implicature
derived from the type of utterance uttered and Grice’s implicatures as the “micro” values of
meaning--both conventional and conversational--an entirely more holistic understanding of
conversational contribution and the speech act of that contribution overlaying one mechanism of
analysis over the other. In the previously stated example of a conversational contribution one
might break down an analysis into addressing the following questions:
1. What is the type of utterance being uttered, and what natural presuppositions does
this type of utterance invoke?
2. What is the specific natural meaning of the utterance and particular words in the
utterance?
3. What other conversational meanings are present as a product of the other moves
made by the utterer and corresponding assumptions and presumptions of the
hearer in the specific conversational context (including but not limited to that
generated by tone, expression, body language, manner, etc…)?
Such an analysis accounts for both the natural and conversationally generated
implicatures Grice uses to analyze a specific conversational contribution, while also explicitly
taking into account broader language conventions surrounding categorized types of utterances,
understood universally.

13

Gricean Thought and Interactive Frame Theory
In continuing to rethink Grice’s theoretical frameworks of language and conversation, I
now turn my attention away from speech act theory and the field of philosophy itself. Reaching
past the borders of a single field of study creates space to bridge perspectives and complexify
understandings beyond the scope offered by those engaging within a single, isolated field.
Outside of philosophical understandings of language and conversation, scholars from a number
of fields have come to understand discourse through frameworks of understanding and
interaction. Such understandings of frames may be categorized twice fold: interactive frames of
interpretation, as used primarily by sociologists and anthropologists, encompass all that informs
the interpretation of a given interaction.37 These, which Tannen and Wallat classify as frames
outline the protocols, procedures, and norms that surround any specific discourse or discourse
community. Frames, in this sense, lay the contextual backdrop to analyzing all interactions.
Participants in an interaction, and by extension a conversation, engage with the material which
surrounds that interaction in order to interpret interpersonal interplay, reception, intention and
direction, and act accordingly. This interpretation and engagement emerges out of the behavioral
and perceived context constituted by verbal and nonverbal cues and is therefore understood as
dynamic.38
The second category of frames might be understood as structures of knowledge, used
primarily in work with artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, and linguistic semantics.39
This category of frames is classified by Tannen and Wallat as knowledge schemas. Schemas
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encompass the cognitive processes, behaviors, and expectations of the participants of a
conversation. While knowledge schemas have previously been considered as static, rooted in
one’s pre-existing meanings and expectations built over time, this notion has evolved in more
contemporary understandings of schemas which realize all structures of expectation and
perception to be dynamic--constantly checked, challenged, and revised through interactions over
time.40, 41, 42 Effectively, schemas refer to malleable patterns of expectation of objects,
conditions, and subjects and the assumptions they inform.43
Tannen and Wallat conduct a discourse analysis of a videotaped interaction between the
mother of a child with cerebral palsy and a pediatrician. They observe and explain the
conversation through the lens of interactive frames and knowledge schemas and form new
conclusions about the engagement between frames and schemas as understood in sociolinguistic
anthropology. Their findings illuminate a process of shifting frames as initiated by a mismatch in
knowledge schemas.44 Participants in an interaction identify frames through the (often
subconscious) evaluation of cues, linguistic and paralinguistic, which inform how they
participate.45 These cues may include tone, facial expression, and word choice, going beyond the
information provided in the words uttered or type of utterance alone. When participants in an
interaction experience a misalignment of schemas, such as when the pediatrician engages from a
knowledge of medical diagnosis while the mother engages from an expectation of parental
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concern and care, the mismatching of the participants’ schemas may prompt a shifting of
interactive frames. When the mother’s and pediatrician’s knowledge schemas deviate, the mother
asks questions, prompting the pediatrician to switch frames and approach the conversation
through the frame indicated by the mother’s questioning.46 Individuals are constantly drawing on
their knowledge schemas to inform their comprehension of utterances, and when a gap in
comprehension is identified, one participant or the other responds by shifting frames to bridge
the gap.
It is these new understandings of the dynamics of interactive frames that concern my
work now. Tannen herself alluded to the broader applicability of interactive framing as a lens to
“understanding how communication works [...] in other contexts as well.”47 Just as Tannen and
Wallat extended the applicability of frames into the worlds of sociology, anthropology, and
linguistics, I see in their work theoretical underpinnings of linguistic understanding that begs to
venture into new territory--that of the philosopher's mind.
The alignment of frames fits effortlessly into Gricean understandings of the logics of a
“successful conversation.” Gricean thought is, after all, devoted to the dynamics of conversation.
Grice’s philosophical study of language diverged from the study of pure semantics into
pragmatics, just as sociolinguistic anthropologists’ understanding of frames diverged from static
structures of expectation to dynamic structures of engagement. In honoring this pattern of
trajectory from monochrome to color, interweaving Grice’s work with a new analytic thread of
thought, frame theory, brings understandings of conversation into a multidimensional,
interdisciplinary form.
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That is to say, what might happen when the Gricean Cooperative Principle comes in
contact with frame theory? If the CP symbolizes the ultimate success of a conversation, one
might base this success on the degree to which the participants of a conversation are able to
identify and react to each other’s conversational necessities and/or desires. This ability to reach
“cooperation” can be assessed by the interactive dexterity of the conversation’s participants--the
footing, the degree of alignment participants take upon themselves and others.48
Ideally, when people come into conversation with each other they engage in a primary
alignment of frames--adapting and aligning themselves, collaborating to set a mutually agreed
upon goal. This goal, perhaps unvoiced, is the principle of cooperation which governs the
success of the conversation. The more familiar both conversants are with the particular frame
they are engaging with and within, the more fluid they are in interpreting, interacting and
communicating with each other. Interactive dexterity proves powerful for understanding the
dynamics behind the cooperation principle much more fluidly than Grice’s checklist approach of
ascription to various maxims. Interactive dexterity within frames may be placed as a sort of
underpinning to Gricean maxims, in fact. If approached as an in-between layer of complexity,
the conversants footing within an interactive frame may account for how the conversants “check
off the boxes” with their conversational contributions.
It is important to remember at this point the shift in understanding of knowledge schemas
from static to dynamic. There is a difference between having an intellectual understanding of a
frame versus an understanding made up of experientially informed expectations that grow and
are flexible, adapting to fit the specifics of the current situation. While Gricean thought tends
specifically to the pragmatics of conversation--as opposed to static semantics--it comes nowhere
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near analyzing conversation as dynamically as frame theory. Grice’s work revolves around
principles and building blocks while frame theory accounts for the organics of conversation and
its flow from one moment to another. When people come together they use not just their
previous knowledge, but also their interpretations of the present moment to effectively work with
each other. This is the intersection of dynamics and philosophy of conversation. It is one thing to
outline cooperation as the central principle built upon a foundation of necessary materials, but
another to account for its nuances and the complexities of crafting and maintaining it.
The previous example of a conversation between two individuals--in which one
individual becomes uncomfortable and changes the subject by asking an unrelated question about
the weather--demonstrates what in Gricean terms constitutes the failure to fulfill a conversation
maxim. Through the flouting of the relevance maxim, the individual shifts the meaning of the
question from its face-value meaning to a suggestion to change topics. Speech act theory
expands on the performativity of the type of utterance itself. Frame theory is used, then, as a
method of understanding the interactive dynamics of the conversant and their contribution. Using
an unrelated question, flouting a maxim, demonstrates the intentional misalignment of frames by
the utterer. The blatant deviation from the previous topic of conversation (the first interactive
frame) illustrates intentionality, suggesting that the individual is flouting the relation maxim.
Accounting for the individual’s interactive dexterity, this move may be understood as the
intentional misalignment of frames and the equally intentional indiscreet call for the other
individual to respond by changing the topic of conversation. In responding to the question about
the weather, the conversants effectively realign themselves within a new interactive frame. The
success of the realignment of frames satisfies the Cooperative Principle and demonstrates the
dynamic property of the principle as it changes moment to moment.

18

Frame theory may also be applied within the Gricean notion of implicature. Knowledge
schemas exist within the scope of conversational implicature, as they consist of the expectations
and understandings of the individual in a specific contextual moment as derived from their
previous exposure to what they evaluate as comparable previous moments. Interactive frames
and the knowledge schemas of those held within them are traceable through a chain of time.
This, effectively, places them within the sphere of conversational implicature. This interweaving
of philosophical and sociocultural linguistic theory expands the original scope of conversational
implicature, for it extends meaning past specific traceable knowledge units--the conversational
contributions in Gricean terms, or the utterance in speech act theory--as schemas encompass both
knowledge and presumptions which are both traceable and cumulative. In this sense interactive
frames have corresponding schemas which operate as a collection of understandings which,
gathered over time, form present expectations. In turn, these expectations inform the individual’s
conversational dexterity through engagement with the current interactive frame. In viewing
conversations through frames and knowledge schemas, a conversation becomes dynamic in its
contextual setting and its participation.
Knowledge schemas may be understood as vessels which hold Gricean understandings of
implicature as conversational contributions, illocutionary acts defined in speech act theory, and
other contextual and conversational meanings evaluated and acted upon through previous
experience. Schemas incorporate both the macro understandings that often drift into the
subconscious through habituation and normalization, as well as the particularities of the unique
situation. Frames and schemas provide an interdisciplinary conversational analysis and
illuminate the inner workings behind the interactions between conversants. As Grice suggests,
the degree of cohesion which individuals engage with each other depends on their fulfillment of
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the maxims of cooperation. Additionally, cooperation may be understood dynamically through
the flow of conversation, revolving around the individuals’ knowledge schemas within the
conversational context which inform their ability to engage successfully.

Conclusions
At the intersection of H.P. Grice’s philosophical “Logic and Conversation” and
philosophical speech act theory lies first the convergence of performativity and implicature.
Grice focuses on the implicature of the content of conversational contributions, discussing the
meanings they convey. Illocutionary acts, as defined under speech act theory, brings focus to the
broader normalized information conveyed through the type of utterance, adding another layer of
analysis to the question of finding meaning in a conversational contribution. Furthermore, the
speech acts--which parallel Grice’s concept of conversational contributions--are understood to
have performative value. Examining the meaning of implicature of conversational contributions
through a lens of performativity highlights the information conveyed through the action of
contributing the material content of the utterance as well as the format in which it is conveyed
(i.e. an inquisition or an exclamation). The intricacies of meaning that may be extracted from a
conversational contribution may be considered a sort of micro level analysis, while broader
structures of utterance may be considered a macro level of analysis. Finally, one must account
for the other contextual meanings present within the conversation and any other performative
information produced by the utterer and potentially interpreted by the receiver, such as but not
limited to tone, facial expression, and physical presentation.
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While examining conversation through a lens of speech act theory illuminates the
performative value of conversational contributions, interactive frame theory adds yet another
layer of understanding to Grice’s philosophical work with conversation. Interactive frames
encompass the contextual foundation of a conversation--the protocols, procedures, and norms
that surround a particular discourse or discourse community. Knowledge schemas (structures of
knowledge and expectation) emerge in correspondence to specific interactive frames. Most
recent iterations of sociocultural and anthropological frame theory invest in an understanding of
all interactive frames and knowledge schemas as dynamic as they are privy to constant revision
overtime. An understanding of dynamics applied to Gricean implicature and performativity value
necessitates an attention to meanings as cumulative products of time and repetition. In
recognizing the cumulative value of implicature it becomes apparent that in addition to holding
performative value, implicature is malleable and particularized to the conversational context and
the individual’s unique lineage of personal experiences and knowledge of socially normalized
expectations.
When applied to Gricean logics of conversation, the Cooperation Principle may be
evaluated through the alignment of interactive frames between participants within a
conversation. Rather than evaluating the success of a conversation through a basic fulfilment of
specific conversational criteria, cooperation may be understood as the dynamic action
participants engage with collaboratively to align and realign the frames within which they are
interacting. The cooperation value of a single moment within a conversation may be analyzed
through the alignment of frames based on the degree to which participants abide with the
conversational maxims. However, in understanding conversations as dynamic in their trajectory,
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the cooperative value of a conversation more wholly may be seen as the participant’s adaptation
to changing frames of discourse. The ability to redirect frames and the corresponding action of
realigning frames becomes a unit on which to measure success of cooperation. The ability to
navigate the dynamics of frames points to the interactive or conversational dexterity of the
participants. Along these lines, the success of failure to cooperate may have less to do with
rational or a quasi-contractual agreement and more to do with the conversational agility of the
individuals engaging within the specific interactive frame. The conversation footing of the
participants of a conversation is the product of their dynamic knowledge schemas produced
through patterns of exposure to previous, comparable frames.
These findings together form a new and expansive vocabulary of conversational analysis,
rooted interdisciplinarily in philosophy of language and linguistic sociology and anthropology. In
practice, this intersection generates a reinvented epistemology that may be used in analyzing
discourses in segmentation and in their entirety. An analysis of conversational moments, the
contributions participants make and receive step by step, involves reviewing the following three
lines of inquiry:
1. What is the type of utterance being uttered, and what natural presuppositions does
this type of utterance invoke,
2. What is the specific natural meaning of the utterance and particular words in the
utterance, and
3. What other conversational meanings are present as a product of the other moves
made by the utterer and corresponding assumptions and presumptions of the
hearer in the specific conversational context (including but not limited to that
generated by tone, expression, body language, manner, etc…)?
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These questions are useful to examine the performative value and implicature generated
and received within a particular conversational moment. These questions should be investigated
with an attention to the dynamics of a conversation as it unfolds more entirely. Cooperation may
be valued step by step, but it must also be understood in the dynamics of its progression.
Interactive frames may be used as a methodology to examine the collaborative dexterity of
participants of a conversation. By identifying conversational shifts in frames, one is able to
evaluate the success of cooperation between individuals. Furthermore, in identifying the
dynamics of individuals’ knowledge schemas one is able to evaluate conversational contributions
as a facet of individuals’ conversational dexterity, rather than in accordance with a theoretical,
underlying conversational contract.
This epistemology may also serve a greater breadth of application purposes. While this
work has been generated from fields centered around language and discourse, its essence appeals
to interpersonal interaction as a whole. Interpersonal interaction reaches far beyond verbal
discourse alone. This structure of analysis has the potential to be applied to nonverbal types of
interaction as well, such as but not limited to partner dancing or collaborative music and arts.
These are, after all, different frames of interaction.
These new theoretical understandings of interaction and analysis may also be applied to
the study of specific social engagements with language. For instance, this framework of
dynamics and implicature could generate new understandings of how individuals socially engage
with gender as it is inscribed into language used in conversation. One could examine the
dynamics of race and the conversations individuals have surrounding race in this particular
cumulative sociopolitical moment and through the dynamics of time. Because this framework of
analysis is interdisciplinary in its creation, its accessibility also extends farther still.
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